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Motivated by graph theory, artificial neural networks (ANNs) are traditionally struc-
tured as layers of neurons (nodes), which learn useful information by the passage
of data through interconnections (edges). In the machine learning realm, graph
structures (i.e., neurons and connections) of ANNs have recently been explored
using various graph-theoretic measures linked to their predictive performance. On
the other hand, in network science (NetSci), certain graph measures including
entropy and curvature are known to provide insight into the robustness and fragility
of real-world networks. In this work, we use these graph measures to explore the
robustness of various ANNs to adversarial attacks. To this end, we (1) explore the
design space of inter-layer and intra-layers connectivity regimes of ANNs in the
graph domain and record their predictive performance after training under different
types of adversarial attacks, (2) use graph representations for both inter-layer and
intra-layers connectivity regimes to calculate various graph-theoretic measures,
including curvature and entropy, and (3) analyze the relationship between these
graph measures and the adversarial performance of ANNs. We show that curvature
and entropy, while operating in the graph domain, can quantify the robustness
of ANNs without having to train these ANNs. Our results suggest that the real-
world networks, including brain networks, financial networks, and social networks
may provide important clues to the neural architecture search for robust ANNs.
We propose a search strategy that efficiently finds robust ANNs amongst a set of
well-performing ANNs without having a need to train all of these ANNs.
1 Introduction
One of the most significant features of today’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the existence of two
























explore Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) through the prism of connectionist approach. Inspired by
the recent work in neuroscience, where specific graph measures were used to quantify the robustness
of brain networks to various insults [2], this paper endeavors to explore these measures for analyzing
the robustness of various ANNs. We begin by generating random graphs (in the graph domain),
converting these graphs to ANNs (deep learning (DL) domain), training these ANNs for various
image classification tasks, and finally evaluating these trained ANNs under adversarial attacks. Our
analysis of graph-theoretical measures and adversarial performance of trained ANNs reveals their
mutual relationship. We propose an efficient algorithm that can help users choose a robust ANN
from any set of ANN architectures without the need to go through the extensive cycle of training,
validation, testing, and comparing all ANNs under consideration. For clarity, we use the term ANN
for artificial neural networks, graphs for the unweighted directed acyclic graphs, and the term network
for various networks as used in the Network Science (NetSci) domain.
A few questions that stem out of the connectionist approach are, (1) can we relate an ANN’s function
to its graph structure? (2) how functional aspects of an ANN change with its graph structure? and
(3) if such a relationship exists, are there any characterizations that explain the relationship between
the graph structure and function of an ANN, especially their performance under adversarial attacks?
Researchers have recently reported the relationship between an ANN’s predictive accuracy and its
underlying graph structure [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. However, most of these architectures are custom-
designed for the specific tasks in the ANN domain. Many researchers have proposed ANNs with
a better predictive performance by varying wiring (i.e., links) between neurons and the operations
they perform [10, 11, 12]. However, these efforts are expensive in terms of time and computational
resources. Recently, Xie et al. [13] proposed a novel method of exploring a diverse set of connectivity
patterns (or graph structures) through random graph-theoretic models. Moreover, You et al. [14]
showed that the graph structure and predictive performance of ANNs are closely related. The work
proposed in [13], referred to as RandWire, and in [14], referred to as Relational Graphs, showed that
exploring a constrained search space for Neural Architecture Search (NAS) leads to better performing
ANNs, quantified using test datasets. However, in the realm of AI safety, there is a need to explore
the structures (or architectures) of ANNs to find robust ANNs for safety critical applications.
It has been shown in Percolation Theory that the underlying network structure of any real-world
system has a key role in its robustness to attacks [15]. Moreover, functional robustness of networks,
quantified by Tannenbaum et al. [16], has been successfully implemented in finding robustness
of networks in NetSci. For example, analysis of cancer cells [17], fragility of financial networks
[18], matching network embedding space with structure of data [19], random graphs [20], social
communities’ identity [21], robustness of brain networks and tracking changes to age and Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) [2], and to explain cognitive impairment in Multiple Sclerosis (MS)
patients [22]. These works provide a solid foundation and motivation for studying the robustness of
ANNs using graph-theoretic measures.
As shown in Figure 1(a), graph theory has long been used in NetSci to study various real-world
networks using graph-theoretic measures. Examples include, biological systems such as brain
networks, economic systems such as financial networks, and social systems such as social networks.
The graph measures include path length, graph connectivity, efficiency, degree measures, clustering
coefficient, and many more. The graph spectral analysis may include graph curvature and entropy
using the graph Adjacency and/or Laplacian matrices. As illustrated by Figure 1(b), in our settings,
the architectures of ANNs are represented by graphs based on the three classical families of random
graph models, Watts-Strogatz (WS), Erdős Rényi (ER), and Barabási-Albert (BA) [23, 24, 25, 13, 14].
Given these graph representations of the architectures of ANNs, we can study various graph-theoretic
properties. We hypothesize that the graph properties quantifying the robustness of different networks
in the NetSci domain, will provide us with the insight into the robustness of ANNs. We provide
experimental evidence to support our hypothesis and present an algorithm that selects a robust ANN
from the given design space without the need to search and train ANN based on the graphs from the
entire design space exhaustively.
2 Related work
Our work is a cross-pollination effort among three fields; graph theory, neuroscience, and machine
learning (i.e., ANNs) . It is well-established that the structure of an ANN is closely related to its
predictive performance [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. It has been shown that the model architecture as a prior is
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Figure 1: Research Hypothesis. (a) Graph theory has been applied in Network Science (NetSci)
to study biological systems such as brain networks, economic systems such as financial networks,
and social systems such as social networks. Graph theoretic measures (curvature, entropy, etc.) have
been successfully employed to quantify robustness and fragility of these networks [17, 2, 22, 18, 21].
(b) Step-1a and 1b: The graphs generated using classical families of random graph models (WS
and WS-flex, ER, and BA) can be used to build Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) through various
transformations [13, 14]. Step-2: We can study various graph-theoretic properties of these random
graphs. Step-3a: We hypothesize that the graph properties that quantify robustness of different
networks in NetSci domain, can also help us in identifying the the ANNs that are robust to adversarial
attacks. Step-3b: Such robust ANNs can be found through an algorithm, without the need to
exhaustively train and search the entire ANNs’ design space. The algorithm will take the graph
properties as the input and, step-4: outputs the structure of the robust ANN for training.
non-trivial for downstream tasks [26]. Traditionally, we witness significant improvement in an ANN’s
predictive performance owing to the evolution of handcrafted wiring plans in the structure of ANNs.
RandWire [13] showed that variants of random graph generators produce graphs of ANNs that have
competitive accuracy as compared to their hand-crafted counterparts. Relational graphs depicted that
the performance of an ANN is approximately a smooth function of graph properties (i.e., clustering
coefficient and average path length). The authors also showed that the best-performing ANNs had
graph structure similar to real biological brain networks [14]. Recently, Robust Networks (RobNets)
investigated the patterns of ANN architectures that were resilient to adversarial attacks and found that
densely connected patterns resulted in improved robustness [27]. However, most real-world networks
are not dense but sparse, with relatively few edges between nodes [28].
Inspired by the biological neuronal networks of C. Elegans and the mouse visual cortex, the Deep
Connectomics Networks (DCNs) were designed for the vision tasks [29]. Brain-inspired AI (BI-AI)
systems have been shown to perform well on cognitive brain data, brain-computer interfaces, multi-
sensory streaming data modelling in finance, environment and ecology [30]. Moreover, brain-inspired
continual and incremental learning helps ANNs prevent catastrophic forgetting [31, 32].
Various graph theoretic properties have been studied to capture the functional robustness of networks
[16]. Weighted graphs and their properties have been studied to distinguish cancer from normal
cell networks [17]. In financial networks, the geometric feature called curvature has been shown
to illustrate the market fragility [18]. In social networks, graph properties help in community
identification in complex networks [21]. In neuroscience, graph properties quantify the robustness
of brain networks, track changes caused by the age and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), and to
explain cognitive impairment in patients with Multiple Sclerosis (MS) [2, 22].
It has been reported that biologically-inspired ANNs are robust to adversarial attacks [33]. Neuro-
inspired CNN with Feedback (CNN-F) is custom-designed CNN having dual pathways that provide
robustness against pixel noise, occlusion, and blurring [34]. Biologically plausible mechanisms in
primate visual ventral system have helped in improving the robustness of ANNs against adversarial
perturbations [35]. VOneNets, a class of hybrid CNN vision models, have shown that precisely
mimicking just one stage of the primate visual system in ANNs leads to better performance in
ImageNet-level computer vision applications [36].
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Among the traditional methods for improving the non-trivial task of adversarial robustness of ANNs
[37, 38, 39], adversarial training [40] is the most propitious at finding the robust model from the
given design-space of architectures. However, besides other drawbacks, adversarial training’s biggest
downside is the significantly large computational cost despite few improvements to speed-up the
process [41, 42, 43, 44]. Therefore, the path to robust ANN design needs to be reconsidered to avoid
the expensive training. In this work, we present one such path that is based on the successes in the
fields of graph theory and NetSci.
3 Methodology
We now present our methodology, starting with the process of generating random graphs. Our
motivation for using random graphs is based on the work of [45], i.e, a randomly organized ANN
model analogizes more closely to a human brain . Moreover, brain networks are mostly random in
terms of physical connections at the initial stages of construction which differs in individuals [46, 47].
3.1 Random Graph Generation
Connectivity patterns of ANNs represented as computational graphs is naturally captured through
inter-layer and intra-layer connectivity. To minimize the human bias, we include one design example
from each of these connectivity choices, (1) RandWire [13] belongs to inter-layer connectivity regime
based on three classical families of random graph generators, i.e., WS, ER, and BA [23, 24, 25], (2)
Relational Graphs are generated using intra-layer connectivity patterns through WS-flex model [14].
ER graph generator, represented by ER(P ), generates graphs with N nodes having an edge with
probability P . BA graph generator, represented by BA(M), iteratively and sequentially adds M
new nodes (and non-duplicate edges) to the initial M nodes having no edges. WS graph generator,
represented by WS(K,P ), uses N initial nodes laid out in ring with each node connected to K/2
neighbors on each side. Moving in clockwise direction, each edge connecting two nodes is rewired
with probability P , the loop is repeated K/2 times. For RandWire, we use generator notation g(θ, s),
where g is the generator (ER, BA, WS), θ represents parameters (P,M, (K,P )), and s is the random
seed [13].
WS-flex model generates relational graphs by generalizing WS model through relaxation of the
same-degree constraint for all nodes. Parameterized by N nodes, K average degree, and P rewiring
probability, these graphs are represented by WS-flex(N,K,P ). It is important to note that ER, BA,
and WS produce a subset of all possible N-node graphs with different underlying priors, whereas,
WS-flex graph generator encompasses all the graphs generated by aforementioned classic random
graph generators. As shown by [14], design space spanned by the global graph measure of average
path length (L), and local graph measure of clustering coefficient (CC) smoothly spans all of the
graphs generated by these graph generators. These two measures have been extensively used in prior
works [23, 48, 49]. Therefore, our design space of graphs is spanned by CC and L as illustrated by
Figure 2. We downsample and aggregate the 2.313M candidate WS-flex graphs into coarser bins of
3854, 441, and 53 graphs, where each bin has at least one representative graph. We also generated 28
graph samples from RandWire (20 from WS, 4 each from ER and BA). A total of 81 graphs are used
in our experiments.
Figure 2: The design space of graphs is presented. The original 2.313 Million candidate graphs from
WS-Flex graph generator are down sampled to 3854, 441, and finally 53 graphs.
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3.2 Graph-Theoretical Properties
We consider following graph-theoretical measures in our analyses. Average Path Length (L) is a
global graph measure defined as the average shortest path distance between any pair of nodes of the
graph. It depicts the efficiency of the graph with which information or communication is transferred
through the nodes [50]. Smaller L means the graph is globally efficient and the information is
exchanged effectively across the whole network and vice versa.
Clustering Coefficient (C) is a measure of local connectivity of a graph. For a given node i in
a graph, the probability that all its neighbors are also neighbors to each other is called clustering
coefficient, and it ranges between 0 and 1. More densely interconnected the neighborhood of a node,
higher is its measure of C. A large value of C is linked with the resilience against random network
damage [51]. The small-worldness of networks is also assessed by the clustering coefficient [52].
Graph Spectral Measures focus on eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the associated graph Adjacency
and Laplacian matrices. The measures of our particular interest are topological entropy and curvature
of graphs.
Topological Entropy or simply entropy (HG) of graph G having adjacency matrix AG is the log-
arithm of the spectral radius of AG, i.e., logarithm of the maximum of absolute values of the
eigenvalues of AG [53].
HG = log(λAG) (1)
Ollivier–Ricci Curvature (ORC) or simply curvature is the discrete analog of the Ricci curvature
[54, 55]. Let (X, d) be a geodesic (a curve representing the shortest path between two points
on a surface or in a Riemannian manifold) metric space having family of probability measures
{px : x ∈ X}. Then ORC κORC(x, y) along the geodesic connecting x and y is,




where W1 is the earth mover’s distance (Wasserstein-1 metric), and d is the geodesic distance on the
space. Curvature is directly proportional to robustness of the network. Larger the curvature, faster
will be the return to the original state after perturbation. Smaller curvature means slow return, which
is also called fragility [2].
Robustness is the rate at which a dynamic system returns to its original state after perturbation.
Fluctuation Theorem [56] states that, given random perturbations to network, change in robustness
∆R is positively correlated to change in system entropy ∆H ,
∆H ×∆R > 0. (3)
Tannenbaum et al. [16] showed that entropy ∆H and curvature ∆κORC are also positively correlated,
∆H ×∆κORC > 0. (4)
From equation (3) and (4), Tannenbaum et al. [16] drew the analogy that graph curvature and
robustness are also positively correlated,
∆κORC ×∆R > 0. (5)
Having generated graphs and studied their properties in graph theory domain, we now transition to
the DL domain for analyzing the corresponding ANNs.
3.3 Transforming Graphs’ Structures to ANNs’ Architectures
For transforming graphs into ANNs, we define edge as the directed transfer of tensor between
nodes it connects, whereas node depicts the troika of aggregation, transformation, and distribution.
Important to note here is that the transformation encapsulates ReLU-Conv-BN operations [57] with
3x3 separable Conv [58]. Stages, strides, and rate of change in channel count have been kept the
same as [13] for the ANNs generated through RandWire (WS, ER, BA) graphs. For generating
different ANNs from relational graphs (WS-flex), we kept the message exchange, node feature, and
aggregation function definitions same as [14]. We generated 5-layer Multilayer Perceptron (MLP)
with 512 hidden units and 6-layer CNN with 3x3 convolutions for each of the 53 WS-flex graphs. For
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the RandWire graphs, we generated 5-layer CNNs with 3x3 convolutions for each of the 28 graphs.
To expand on the model categories, we then generated ResNet-18 networks from each of the 53
WS-flex graphs. Total 187 ANNs were generated (53x3 for WS-flex, 28 for RandWire graphs).
Training, Validating and Testing ANNs: We used CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets [59] for
training 53 MLPs, 53 CNNs from WS-flex, and 28 CNNs from RandWire. Our experiments also
included Tiny ImageNet dataset with ResNet-18 [60] for 53 WS-flex ANNs. For verifying the
hypothesis on varying number of nodes, we kept n=64 nodes for WS-flex ANNs and n=32 nodes
with C=109 channels for RandWire ANNs. For each instance of ANNs, a random seed value s=5
was used to train and evaluate on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets and the average validation
accuracy was recorded for all five random seeds. The hyperparameters for training and evaluating
MLPs, CNNs, and ResNet-18s were kept the same as [14, 13], except the batch size of 1024 and 100
epochs for CNNs. Complete set of hyperparameters is given in the supplementary section. Due to
limitations in computational resources and large training times, we did not carryout experiments on
ImageNet dataset [61].
Testing Under Adversarial Attacks: After training the aforementioned ANNs, we subjected them
to testing with adversarial examples; for a valid input x1 and a target class y1, it is possible to find
x′1 through imperceptible non-random perturbation to x1 which changes ANN’s prediction to some
other y2; such x′1 is called an adversarial example. From the commonly employed White-box attacks
[40, 62, 63, 64, 65], where model architecture, parameters, and training data is known to the attacker,
we used Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [62, 63] and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [40] as
adversarial attacks in our experiments with noise ε=[0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3] for FGSM and ε=8/255 and
α=1/255 for PGD.
ANN Performance and Graph Measures: We compare the ANNs’ predictive performance with
graph-theoretic measures of their corresponding graphs. We calculated the graphs-theoretic measures
L, C, H , and κORC given in section 3.2 for each of the 81 graphs. For the corresponding ANNs of
these graphs, we recorded their predictive performance under adversarial as well as non-adversarial
conditions. As per our hypothesis, certain ANNs should report higher predictive performance under
adversarial conditions.
Algorithm 1 Robust Model Selection
Input: data x, task t, nodes n, number of graphs to be selected α
repeat
for (τ graphs ∈ n-node design space) do
find all graphs Gτ (n)
calculate κOR(Gτ ), H(Gτ ) (graph measures)
end for
for i← 1 to α do
Gi = max(Gτ (κOR, H)) (graphs having highest curvature, entropy measures)
[RGα]←Gi (add to the list of robust graphs)
end for
until (α robust graphs (RGα) found)
{required number of graphs found}
repeat
convert robust graphs to neural networks, RGα→NNα
for j ← 1 to α do
train, validate NNj(x, t)
calculate adversarial accuracy (AdvAcc(NNj)
end for
select Robust NN = max(AdvAcc(NNj))
until (Robust Neural Network found)
Search for Robust ANNs in the Graph Domain: We propose a search method for robust ANNs
based on the graph properties of ANNs and avoiding exhaustive search. Algorithm 1 finds the
architecture of an ANN that is robust under adversarial conditions without the need to undergo the
train-validate-test loop for all the given models/ choices of architectures. The input parameters of the
algorithm include dataset x, task t, number of nodes n, and the number of ANNs to be considered
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α. For all possible (τ ) number of graphs in the given design space of n-node graphs, calculate
curvature (κORC) and entropy (H). Select α number of graphs having highest κORC and H values.
Convert these α graphs to ANNs. All these α ANNs have higher robustness than the rest of (τ − α)
ANNs. Train α ANNs for the downstream task t and select the ANN with the highest adversarial
accuracy. Selection of parameter α is at the user’s discretion as per availability of resources such as
computational power and time, generally α ≤10.
4 Results
The test accuracy of trained ANNs under different adversarial conditions is compared with their clean
accuracy. We also compare κORC and H graph measures with adversarial performance of ANNs.
(a) WS-flex CNNs (b) WS CNNs (c) BA CNNs (d) ER CNNs
Figure 3: FGSM attack results for CNN on CIFAR-10. CNNs from the four graph models (WS-
flex, WS, BA, ER) trained and tested on CIFAR-10 under varying adversarial noises, i.e., ε=[0, 0.05,
0.1, 0.2, 0.3], where ε=0 means no adversarial attack. Black line depicts the best performing CNN at
ε=0 when subjected to higher ε values. This CNN is no more the best network as ε increases.
(a) WS-flex CNNs (b) WS CNNs (c) BA CNNs (d) ER CNNs
Figure 4: FGSM attack results for CNN on CIFAR-100. Our CNNs trained and tested on CIFAR-
100 under varying adversarial noises, i.e., ε=[0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3]. Black line depicts the best
performing CNN at ε=0 when subjected to higher ε values which is not the best for higher ε.
CIFAR-10/100 Datasets: The first set of experiments is for the CIFAR-10 [59] dataset using CNNs
belonging to the WS-flex, WS, BA, and ER graph models. The test accuracy of these CNNs is
plotted against various levels of adversarial noise (ε) for the FGSM attacks in Figure 3. As seen in
Figure 3(a), the difference between highest and lowest test accuracy of CNN for WS-flex models
under non-adversarial conditions is 1.98%, whereas, this difference increases to 2.11% at highest
value of ε = 0.3. This spread is more visible in case of WS CNNs (3.1% at ε = 0 to 9.6% at ε = 0.3),
BA CNNs (0.87% at ε = 0 to 6.27% at ε = 0.3), and ER CNNs (0.37% at ε = 0 to 1.35% at ε = 0.3),
Figure 3(b)(c)(d). This means that the performance of CNNs in each category of models is almost
the same in the absence of any adversarial noise but they perform very differently under adversarial
attacks. The second set of experiments is on CIFAR-100 [59] dataset using CNNs belonging to the
WS-flex, WS, BA, and ER graph models. Test accuracy of these CNNs is plotted against various
levels of adversarial noise (ε) for the FGSM attacks in Figure 4. For these CNNs, the difference
between highest and lowest test accuracy of CNN for all categories of models does not show the
behavior of spreading out at higher ε values because of the increase in the dataset complexity whereas
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model architectures are the same as tested on CIFAR-10 dataset. We notice in our results on both the
datasets that the best performing CNN under non-adversarial conditions does not remain the best as
we increase the adversarial noise from ε = 0→ 0.3. This can be seen by tracing the black line in the
respective plots of Figure 3 and 4. This shows that our best CNN under non-adversarial conditions is
not the most robust one in each model category. Now let us compare ANNs’ adversarial accuracies
with graph measures to assess their robustness.
Graph Measures and Adversarial Performance: Graph curvature and entropy values plotted
against adversarial performance of ANNs is given in Figure 5 for WS-flex CNNs on CIFAR-10,
Figure 6 for WS and BA CNNs on CIFAR-10, Figure 7 for WS-flex CNNs on CIFAR-100, and
Figure 8 for WS, BA, and ER CNNs on CIFAR-100. Each datum represents a CNN, color-coded
according to its curvature and entropy measures. As seen in the plots, the CNNs having higher
curvature and entropy values come out to be among the best CNNs under higher adversarial conditions
for all categories of models and lie in the top right quadrant of each plot. These CNNs bearing higher
curvature-entropy values prove to be consistently robust.
Figure 5: Graph measures vs. adversarial performance for WS-flex CNNs on CIFAR-10. Each datum
is a CNN. Top row (Curvature vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). Bottom row (Entropy
vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). CNNs with higher graph values (κORC>700, H>3.5)
perform well under non-adversarial (ε=0) as well as under adversarial attacks (ε=0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3).
At ε=0.3, the best CNN is the one with the highest κORC and H values. The robust CNNs (having
higher κORC , H , and accuracies) lie in the top right portion of each plot.
Further Experiments and Failure Cases: We extended our experiments to include Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) attacks [40] for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. We also experimented with
Tiny ImageNet dataset [60] for the 53 WS-flex ANNs. These results are given in the supplementary
section. In our experiments with ER CNNs on CIFAR-10 dataset, we noticed that these CNNs have
negligible accuracy spread across all values of ε and so the robustness measures are not profoundly
variable. This is possibly because each edge’s wiring in ER(P) is independent. We give these plots in
the supplementary section.
Analysis of the Search Algorithm: Based on our results, we analyze our search algorithm 1 for the
robust ANN. Let us analyze this algorithm on our experiments with WS-flex CNNs on CIFAR-10
dataset. Given the dataset x=CIFAR10, task t=image classification, n=64 number of nodes, and α=6
ANNs to be selected out of the total τ=2.313 Million graphs. We calculate H and κORC given by Eq.
1 and 2 respectively. The α=6 graphs with highest values ofH and κORC areG(κORC ,H)={(1835.88,
4.10), (1577.94, 4.03), (1365.30, 3.95), (1154.22, 3.83), (951.0, 3.72), (884.40, 3.70)}. Under highest
value of ε=0.3 for FGSM attack, the predictive performance of corresponding 5-layer MLPs is Test
Accuracy={21.33, 21.40, 21.23, 21.14, 21.03, 20.99} respectively which is higher than all the ANNs
under evaluation. The best ANN at ε=0 has G(κORC , H)=(77.83, 2.2) which is no more among the
best ANNs at higher ε values. Plots for WS-flex MLPs on CIFAR-10 are given in supplementary
section.
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Figure 6: Graph measures vs. adversarial performance for WS and BA CNNs on CIFAR-10. Each
datum is a CNN. Refer to the figure legends for each category of network. Top row (Curvature
vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). Bottom row (Entropy vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM
attack). Among the best performing CNNs at all levels of adversarial noise (ε), the ones with higher
curvature and entropy values are consistent and they lie in the top right portion of each plot.
Figure 7: Graph measures vs. adversarial performance for WS-flex CNNs on CIFAR-100. Each datum
is a CNN. Top row (Curvature vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). Bottom row (Entropy vs.
Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). CNNs with lower curvature and entropy values perform well
under non-adversarial (ε=0), but as (ε) increases, the CNNs with higher curvature and entropy values
(κORC>700, H>3.5) perform better and these CNNs lie in the top right portion of each plot.
5 Broader Impact
Our work offers a novel approach to quantify robustness of ANNs through graph curvature and
entropy. We present an algorithm to efficiently find the most robust ANNs by avoiding the search
mechanisms that involve exhaustive training and evaluation. We believe that this work will have a
high impact on the acceptability of safety-critical AI applications.
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Figure 8: Graph measures vs. adversarial performance for WS, BA, ER CNNs on CIFAR-100. Each
datum is a CNN. Refer to the figure legends for each category of network. Top row (Curvature
vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). Bottom row (Entropy vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM
attack). Among the best performing CNNs at all levels of adversarial noise (ε), the ones with higher
curvature and entropy values are consistent and they lie in the top right portion of each plot.
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APPENDIX
A Further Experiments and Results
Here we provide additional results of our experiments on CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet datasets.
The 53 graphs from WS-flex models converted into 53 Multilayer Perceptron networks (MLPs) are
trained on CIFAR-10 dataset and tested under FGSM and PGD attack conditions. Furthermore, these
53 WS-flex graphs transformed into 53 ResNet18 ANNs are trained on Tiny ImageNet dataset and
tested under FGSM and PGD attack conditions.
A.1 WS-flex MLPs on CIFAR-10 dataset
As seen in Figure 9(a), the 53 WS-flex MLPs trained on CIFAR-10 dataset have comparable test
accuracies for all values of FGSM ε, i.e., the difference between highest and lowest test accuracy of
these MLPs at each level of adversarial noise is almost same (1.59% at ε = 0, 0.92% at ε = 0.05,
1.07% at ε = 0.1, 1.46% at ε = 0.2, and 1.68% at ε = 0.3). However, when these 53 MLPs are
subjected to PGD attack, this difference becomes significantly high (8.5% under PGD attack). This
means that the performance of these MLPs is almost the same in the absence of any adversarial noise
and under FGSM attacks but they perform very differently under the PGD adversarial attacks. We
opine that this happens because of two reasons; firstly the complexity level of MLPs is very low
as compared to other ANNs in our experiments, secondly the iterative nature of PGD attacks have
amplified effect on the performance of simple-structured ANNs like MLPs. Now let us compare
these MLPs’ adversarial accuracies with graph measures to assess their robustness.
Figure 9: (a) Adversarial attack results for WS-flex MLPs on CIFAR-10. 53 WS-flex MLPs
trained and tested on CIFAR-10 under varying FGSM adversarial noises (ε=[0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3])
and PGD attack. Black line depicts the best performing MLP at ε=0 (no adversarial attack). When
subjected to higher ε values, this best MLP (at ε=0) does not remain the best.
(b) Adversarial attack results for WS-flex ResNet18 on TinyImageNet. 53 WS-flex ResNets
trained and tested on TinyImageNet under varying FGSM adversarial noises (ε=[0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2,
0.3]) and PGD attack. Black line depicts the best performing ResNet18 at ε=0 (no adversarial attack).
When subjected to higher ε values, this best ResNet (at ε=0) is still among the best.
Graph Measures and Adversarial Performance: Graph curvature and entropy values plotted
against adversarial performance of our 53 WS-flex MLPs is given in Figure 10 for CIFAR-10 dataset.
Each datum represents an MLP, with pink color for MLPs having curvature κORC > 700, and entropy
HG > 3.5. As seen in the plots, MLPs with high curvature and entropy values come out to be among
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the best MLPs under higher adversarial conditions and lie in the top right quadrant of plots. These
MLPs bearing higher curvature-entropy values prove to be robust among the 53 MLP samples.
Figure 10: Graph measures vs. adversarial performance for WS-flex MLPs on CIFAR-10. Each
datum is an MLP. Top row (Curvature vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). Bottom row
(Entropy vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). MLPs with higher graph values (κORC>700,
HG>3.5), depicted by pink-colored datums do not perform well under non-adversarial conditions
(ε=0) as compared to other MLPs. However, as FGSM adversarial attack noise increases (ε=[0.05,
0.1, 0.2, 0.3]), the MLPs having higher graph measures out-perform other MLPs. At ε=0.3, the best
MLP is the one with the highest κORC and H values. These robust MLPs lie in the top right quadrant
of the higher ε plots.
A.2 WS-flex ResNet18 on Tiny ImageNet
We also experimented with Tiny ImageNet dataset for the 53 WS-flex ANNs. As seen in Figure 9(b),
the 53 WS-flex ResNets trained on Tiny ImageNet dataset have varying test accuracies under non-
adversarial conditions (ε = 0). This is due to the complexity of both the dataset and the models
being trained on this dataset. As values of FGSM ε increases, the ResNets tend to have comparable
performance. Moreover, by tracing the black line we notice that the ResNet which was the best
under non-adversarial conditions, continue to be among the best performing ResNets under higher
adversarial noise values. We will see in subsequent plots that this ResNet has higher values of
curvature and entropy. Now let us look at the curvature and entropy plots for these ResNets to assess
their robustness.
Graph Measures and Adversarial Performance: Graph curvature and entropy values plotted
against adversarial performance of our 53 WS-flex ResNet18 models is given in Figure 11 for Tiny
ImageNet dataset. Each datum represents a ResNet18 model, with pink color for ResNets having
curvature κORC > 700, and entropy HG > 3.5. As seen in the plots, the ResNets having higher
curvature and entropy values are the best even before they are subjected to adversarial noise. And
under adversarial conditions, these ResNets continue to prove themselves to be the robust choices
regardless of the level of adversarial noise value.These robust ResNets lie in the top right quadrant of
all the plots of Figure 11.
A.3 Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Attacks
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attacks are also included for our experiments on CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet datasets. The CIFAR results are shown in Figure 12. The 53
MLPs and 53 CNNs from WS-flex graph models were subjected to PGD attacks for CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets respectively. Performance comparison of these ANNs without any adversarial
attack versus the same ANNs under PGD attacks is shown in the Figure 12. We see that ANNs having
higher curvature and entropy values are consistently among the best performing ANNs under PGD
attacks not only for the different ANN types (MLPs and CNNs), but also for the different dataset
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Figure 11: Graph measures vs. adversarial performance for WS-flex ResNet18s on Tiny ImageNet.
Each datum is a ResNet18 ANN. Top row (Curvature vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack).
Bottom row (Entropy vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). ResNets with higher graph values
(κORC>700, HG>3.5), depicted by pink-colored datums, are the best performing models under
non-adversarial conditions (ε=0). These ResNets continue to be among the best as FGSM adversarial
attack noise increases (ε=[0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3]). These robust ResNets lie in the top right quadrant of
each plot.
tasks (CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100). So our algorithm for robust model selection presented in the main
paper stands valid on the ANNs under PGD attacks as well.
Figure 12: Comparison of graph curvature and entropy measures against performance of WS-
flex ANNs under PGD attack. (Left two columns): WS-flex MLPs on CIFAR-10. (Right two
columns): WS-flex CNNs on CIFAR-100. Top row depicts curvature vs. performance of ANNs
without adversarial attack (ε=0) and under PGD attack. Bottom row depicts entropy vs. performance
of ANNs without adversarial attack (ε=0) and under PGD attack. For both datasets, better performing
ANNs under PGD attack are among those having higher curvature and entropy values.
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Figure 13: Comparison of graph curvature and entropy measures against performance of WS-flex
ResNet18s on Tiny ImageNet dataset under PGD attack. (a): Network Curvature vs. adversarial
accuracy under PGD attack. (b): Network Entropy vs. adversarial accuracy under PGD attack. The
ResNet18 model having higher curvature and entropy values are among the best performing models
under PGD attacks.
A.4 Exceptional Cases
In our experiments with ER CNNs on CIFAR-10 dataset, we noticed that these CNNs have similar
accuracy spread (≈ 2%) across all values of FGSM attack noise (ε=[0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3]). Moreover,
the graph-theoretic measures of curvature and entropy for these graph models are higher than their
corresponding counter-parts from WS and BA models. The minimum values of graph measures
in our sample set of ER models (κORC = 34.01, HG = 1.95) are close to the thresholds selected
for performance comparison (κORC = 50 and HG = 2). This means that the resulting robustness
measures of ER CNNs are not profoundly different from each other. We are of the opinion that this is
possibly because each edge’s wiring in ER(P) is independent and ER models inherently have higher
curvature and entropy values. So we cannot clearly pick the robust CNN from the sample set of ER
models, especially in case of smaller dataset tasks such as CIFAR-10.
Figure 14: Graph measures vs. adversarial performance for ER CNNs on CIFAR-10. Each datum is
a CNN. Pink-colored CNNs have higher curvature and entropy values as indicated by the legends.
Top row (Curvature vs. Test Accuracy under FGSM attack). Bottom row (Entropy vs. Test
Accuracy under FGSM attack). The curvature and entropy values of ER CNNs are greater than or
almost equal to the corresponding threshold values (κORC = 50 and HG = 2). Hence there is no
significant performance variance among all ER CNNs.
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B Compute Resources and Wall Clock Times
Training an MLP transformed from the complete graph of WS-flex model on CIFAR-10 dataset
approximately takes 7 minutes on NVIDIA TITAN RTX GPU. Each MLP was trained 5 times with
random seed, consuming approximately 40 minutes for training. On the NVIDIA TITAN RTX GPU,
training of all 53 MLPs on CIFAR-10 approximately took 3 days. For CIFAR-100 dataset, the 53
CNNs took approximately 5 days for training. The RandWire ANNs from WS, BA, and ER models
take approximately 3 hours on the NVIDIA TITAN RTX GPU for training on both CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets with random seed of 5. The 28 RandWire CNNs took approximately 5 days
using the same TITAN RTX GPU. For Tiny ImageNet experiments on the 53 WS-flex ResNet18
ANNs, the baseline model took approximately 3 hours on TITAN RTX GPU whereas the most sparse
ResNet18 took approximately 18 hours of training. Total training time for WS-flex ResNet18 models
on Tiny ImageNet was approximately 22 days. All the aforementioned training times include the
testing time for FGSM and PGD adversarial attacks. For tracking the experiments, visualisation of
results, and hyperparameter tuning, we used the Weights and Biases (https://wandb.ai/) which
is freely available performance visualization platform for machine learning tasks.
C Hyperparameters for Experiments
The relevant hyperparameters for our experiments are as shown in Figure 15. For the sake of proce-
dural consistency and comparisons of results, the set of parameters other than the those mentioned in
Figure 15 have been kept the same as in original experiments for RandWire and Relational Graphs by
their respective authors.
Figure 15: Training hyperparameters for all experiments.
18
